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The publication of Arne Naess’ paper “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology 
Movement: A Summary” was almost immediately embraced around the world. It expressed the 
radical spirit of the time looking for a unified vision beyond consumerism, industrial capitalism, 
exploitation and oppression of Third-World countries, and destruction of nature, questioning 
the roots of these in the anthropocentrism of the culture of Western civilization. It became a 
reference point for what became a growing field of environmental ethics, although Naess was 
highly critical of the ‘man-in-environment’ image presupposed by conceiving ethics in this way. 
Those who embraced ‘deep ecology’ revisited and attempted to integrate the work of a range 
of philosophers, most importantly Spinoza and the work of a number of ecologists, including 
Aldo Leopold, while fostering a new respect for non-Western cultures and religions. It was 
criticized by philosophers who claimed to be defending more radical views, such as the eco-
feminists, with the most extreme position being put forward by Richard Sylvan. His ‘deep green’ 
philosophy questioned the life-centric attitudes of the deep ecologists. Other radicals, such as 
Murray Bookchin, criticized it for being anti-human while more orthodox philosophers treated 
it as a challenge to their basic philosophical beliefs. While these more orthodox philosophers 
defended the traditions with which they were aligned, they were also stimulated to extend 
them, to argue that Christianity, rights theory or utilitarianism had the resources required to 
embrace the concerns of the deep ecologists. ‘Deep ecology’ was one of the most important 
reference points for radical ‘environmentalists’. Over the next thirty years anthologies were 
published at regular intervals dealing with and developing the philosophy of deep ecology. 
While initially many ecologists sought to distance themselves from radical environmentalists 
who embraced their science, other ecologists became increasingly sympathetic to their ideas. 
The last major anthology on deep ecology, Beneath the Surface: Critical Essays in the Philosophy 
of Deep Ecology, edited by Eric Katz, Andrew Light, and David Rothenberg was published in 
2000 and suggested a convergence between eco-feminism, postmodernism, ecology, 
proponents of non-Western attitudes to nature, and other radical critiques of mainstream 
anthropocentric thinking and alignment of all this with deep ecology, with criticisms of deep 
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ecology being met and new horizons opening up.1 Then, publications on deep ecology became 
rarer. Today, as we face a global ecological catastrophe that could destroy most of the world’s 
ecosystems and species and threatens the lives of billions of people, the deep ecology 
movement appears as a quaint echo from the past.  
It could be claimed that this brief sketch misrepresents what has happened. Those aligned with 
deep ecology have continued to develop and promote their ideas under different labels. 
Michael E. Zimmerman, for instance, originally influenced by Heidegger and a deep ecology 
fellow traveler, published Contesting Earth’s Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity in 1994, 
most of which was devoted to deep ecology.2 Since then he has aligned himself with Ken Wilber 
and written a major work with Sean Esbjörn-Hargens, titled Integral Ecology: Multiple 
Perspectives on the Natural World, which was published in 2009. Wibler and Esbjörn-Hargens’ 
work is not identified as a work concerned with deep ecology and only has one reference to 
Naess. Deep ecology is acknowledged as only one of a very large number of movements of 
environmental thought. Nevertheless, it can still be seen as a development within this 
tradition.3 However, even interpreted in this way it appears that the intellectual climate had 
changed. This book has not had the impact of Zimmerman’s earlier books. His book Heidegger’s 
Confrontation with Modernity published in 1990 shows 469 online citations according to Google 
and Contesting Earth’s Future published four years later shows 369 citations; Integral Ecology 
shows just 8. While only being one example, this reflects the declining interest aroused by such 
work.  
It is impossible to understand this marginalization simply in terms of debates within 
environmental philosophy or within the Green movement. It is a manifestation of far broader 
changes. One of these is the decline of the status of philosophy itself, and along with 
philosophy, the humanities generally. Philosophy nowadays is valued almost entirely for its 
contribution of symbolic logic and its semantics to the development of information technology. 
Apart from that, as with other disciplines in the humanities, it is regarded as part of the 
entertainment industry, for the small number of people who like to play intellectual parlour 
games. This in turn reflects the transformation of universities, from public institutions 
preserving, developing, and passing on from one generation to the next the culture of nations 
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and civilizations, into transnational business corporations training people for jobs to improve 
their and earning power.4 These developments are part of a massive transformation of the 
entire world-order. What is driving this transformation? 
THE NEO-LIBERAL REVOLUTION 
Those who thought of themselves at the cutting edge of radical thought in the 1970s were 
really the last gasp of an earlier transformation of the world that had begun in the late 
nineteenth century, a transformation that had been accelerated by the First World War and 
then the Great Depression and World War II. This was a project to overcome the brutality of the 
nineteenth century world-order associated with imperialism and the subordination of societies 
to market forces legitimated by economists and social Darwinists. It was associated with 
support for democracy, egalitarianism and greater ‘humanity’, and liberation of previously 
subjugated peoples. Despite massive resistance and many false directions this struggle was 
successful, with the advance of democracy, the development of the League of Nations, the 
defeat of Nazism, and then after World War II, the establishment of the United Nations. These 
were associated with efforts to create a world order in which each nation would be recognized 
as having the right to self-determination, the advance of the welfare state and social 
democracy, and the growth of large middle-classes in nations that had achieved self-
determination, the liberalization of communism in Eastern Europe after the death of Stalin, and 
successful struggles against imperialism and then neo-colonialism in Third World countries. 
Deep ecology appeared as the logical next step in this advance, rejecting the elitism of Western 
environmentalists promoting ‘life-boat ethics’ and extolling the value of all life.  
This transformation always had its opponents; after World War II, they had regrouped under 
the banner of neo-liberalism.5 Aligned with big business, the leaders of this movement 
identified Stalinism, Naziism, social democracy, and the welfare state with mass rule 
threatening individual freedom, and planned to return the world to the form of free-market 
capitalism that had existed in the nineteenth century (although there were neo-liberals who 
were far less extreme, just as there had been Marxist opponents to Stalinism in the Soviet 
Union and Nazi opponents of Hitler in Germany). After working out their strategy in 1947 at 
Mont Pèlerin, they seized their opportunity with the political turmoil of the late 1960s and early 
1970s and then the economic crisis of the 1970s. Major landmarks in the success of this project 
were the co-opting of leaders of the Chinese Communist Party and trade unions and social 
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democratic and labor parties in the First World, the domination of the media by a small number 
of globalized media moguls, augmented by massive expenditure on advertising and public 
relations (the mind-control industries), followed by the implosion of communist countries of 
Eastern Europe, the privatization or subversion of public institutions such as universities, the 
deregulation and increasing power of financial institutions, all accompanied by the continued 
growth and power of transnational corporations and their managers.6 Removing trade barriers, 
freeing capital to move where-ever labour is cheapest and regulations most lax, undermining 
the tax base of governments and plundering public assets, promoting managerialism, removing 
job security and deprofessionalizing the work force, and dismantling the welfare state while 
developing new technologies of surveillance are just some of the manifestations of this. Right 
from the beginning of their ascendancy in the 1970s, the members of this movement saw the 
greatest threat to their hegemony coming from their inability to deal with environmental 
problems and from environmentalists. They embraced the notion of ‘sustainable development’ 
as a slogan that would enable them to co-opt environmentalists.7  
All these developments required new technologies together with ideological legitimation. In 
hindsight, it was the development of information technology based on advances in symbolic 
logic, the revival of neo-classical economics by Milton Friedman in opposition to Keynesian 
economics and the revival of social-Darwinism by socio-biologists and psychologists that were 
the really significant intellectual revolutions of the 1970s.8 
The success of the neo-liberals meant disempowering national governments and the general 
population, taking control of State institutions and using them as instruments to serve the 
interests of corporations rather than nations. Together with efforts to corrupt core institutions 
required for the functioning of democracy (such as the press and the education system), this 
undermined the public sphere. In place of traditional broadly educated intellectuals engaging 
people in the public sphere, universities promoted a new kind of integrated technocratic 
intellectual connected to the knowledge industry who questioned the cognitive claims both of 
old style intellectuals and the general public. As the full implications of the success of the neo-
liberals dawned on people it was not philosophers, let alone deep ecologists, who led the 
challenge to neo-liberalism, but radical economists, climate scientists and ecologists, specialist 
intellectuals with the credentials to challenge their more conformist colleagues. For those who 
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were still interested in resisting neo-liberalism and taking democracy seriously, there appeared 
to be no need to look to philosophers or philosophy to interpret these thinkers. They could turn 
to the original theorists, many of whom were beginning to write for broader audiences in 
frustration at their inability to influence governments. They did not refer to deep ecology.  
Does this mean that the deep ecology movement was merely the expression of a marginal 
group of academics and poets in the First World, made possible by the struggles of people in 
the past who had created and sustained the institutions that provided them with the conditions 
to develop and disseminate their ideas? It could be argued that the apparent success of deep 
ecologists in the 1970s, 80s and 90s came from their having gained tenured positions in 
universities before their transformation. As these academics retired, their readership 
disappeared. Like so many purported radicals of the late 1960s and early 1970s, through the 
inadequacy of their ideas to orient people to act and live, the deep ecologists were to some 
extent culpable in the triumph of neo-liberalism. As Hegel argued, ideas are only refuted by the 
ideas that replace them, and far from replacing the dominant ideas, deep ecologists left in the 
lurch people who looked to them for guidance in the face of the growing power of neo-liberals, 
transnational corporations and the new global ruling class, the corporatocracy, reinvigorating 
Nineteenth Century cultural forms.9 
To evaluate this suggestion it is necessary to examine the ideas of the deep ecologists from a 
broader historical perspective. 
THE ‘RADICAL’ AND ‘MODERATE’ ENLIGHTENMENTS 
The debates that took place between deep ecologists and allied radical environmentalists, to 
begin with at least, were rather bewildering. While Naess looked back to Spinoza, others 
defended Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, among many others. The aim was often to 
demonstrate that some philosopher or other was really a proto-deep ecologist, as though this 
was somehow going to lead more people to become deep ecologists, or perhaps more plausibly, 
to rank their favourite philosopher a little higher. However, such arguments were productive 
because in conjunction with work in the history of ideas, it gradually became apparent that 
these philosophers were not isolated thinkers but part of a tradition with its own history, a 
tradition opposed to the dominant ideas of modernity. It was a submerged tradition, 
submerged by a tradition that began and developed in reaction to this submerged tradition. To 
begin with, this alternative tradition was characterized as postmodernism, but this was 
misleading and it is my contention that this should be recognized as a revival of what Margaret 
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Jacob dubbed the ‘Radical Enlightenment’.10 The mainstream or what has recently been called 
the mainstream or ‘Moderate Enlightenment’ (as Jonathan Israel called it)11 does go back to 
Francis Bacon, as Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer argued in their famous work, Dialectic 
of the Enlightenment; however it was more influenced by John Locke’s philosophy and 
Newton’s physics. These in turn were made possible by the work of Hobbes and Descartes. 
While in the past it was common to see this Moderate Enlightenment as developing in reaction 
to medieval thought, it is now being argued that it emerged as a reaction to more radical ideas. 
Israel claims that it was Spinoza’s philosophy that they were reacting against. However, Jacob 
saw this as a continuation of Renaissance thought, particularly in its most radical form in the 
work of Giordano Bruno. The Renaissance gave birth to the civic humanists (people educated in 
the humanities) who revived Roman republicanism and Greek philosophy in their efforts to 
defend their liberty. Bruno’s work was a radicalization of Renaissance thought. The philosophies 
of Descartes and Hobbes, developed to counter the influence of Bruno and the civic humanists, 
have been characterized as the counter-Renaissance.12 The Radical Enlightenment, which 
survived as an underground movement in the first half of the Eighteenth Century, kept alive 
and further developed these Renaissance ideas. 
The central concern of the Renaissance civic humanists was to cultivate the virtues required for 
people to defend their ‘liberty’ (that is, the condition where they were not being dependent 
upon the good will of others who could arbitrarily harm them) and to govern themselves 
wisely.13 This meant defending a conception of humans as capable of such self-governance.  
Bruno’s concern was to extend this philosophy to embrace even the poor and to defend a 
conception of nature as self-organizing, promoting a religion of nature which legitimated in a 
more egalitarian form the values of the civic humanists.14 For this reason he and those who 
followed him were characterized as the Nature Enthusiasts. The development of the new 
‘mechanical philosophy’ of Descartes and Hobbes was designed to combat the influence of 
these ideas, to deny any but instrumental value to nature and, in the case of Hobbes, to 
                                                     
10 
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reconceive humans and their goals and change the meaning of words such as freedom so that 
the liberty defended and aspired to by the civic humanists would become unintelligible.15 If we 
use the terminology of Aristotle, Hobbes was really defending rule by an intelligent tyrant. This 
was rejected by Locke, but as C.B. Macpherson argued in The Political Theory of Possessive 
Individualism, ‘all the evidence [is] that Locke was not a democrat at all.’16  From an Aristotelian 
perspective, he was a defender of ‘oligarchy’, that is, rule by an elite acting on self-interest 
rather than for the common good.17 Locke was promoting possessive individualism and 
religious tolerance rather than liberty as the Romans and Renaissance neo-Romanists had 
understood it, or democracy as this had been understood in Ancient Greece.18 These are the 
ideas taken up by the Moderate Enlightenment, and it is not difficult to trace this influence and 
the evolution of this form of the Enlightenment. The project and grand narrative of the 
Moderate Enlightenment indeed was, as Adorno and Horkheimer revealed, ‘the 
disenchantment of the world … to learn from nature … how to use it in order to wholly 
dominate it and other men.’19 This was based on the acceptance of Newtonian science and 
Locke’s epistemology and political philosophy, in each case based on the assumption that all 
complex wholes can be entirely explained as effects of the interaction between their atomic 
components. Locke’s conception of society and politics as based on contracts to protect 
property was followed by the development of utilitarianism. While utilitarianism’s most 
important expositor, Jeremy Bentham, rejected the notion of rights and defended a form of 
democracy, utilitarianism also derived from Locke’s psychology according to which evil is pain 
and good is pleasure. Utilitarianism was first and foremost a doctrine of social control, as 
Foucault reminded us. Following Hobbes’ portrayal of society and Newton’s model of science, 
Adam Smith incorporated both these dimensions of Locke’s philosophy into economic theory 
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As Quentin Skinner argued in Hobbes and Republican Liberty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) and 
elsewhere. 
16
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which then represented society to its members as a machine driven by the egoism of 
individuals.20  
The Radical Enlightenment maintained a subterranean presence, however. Jonathan Israel 
argued that this was associated with Spinoza, but it was Spinozism rather than Spinoza himself 
that influenced the radicals.21 Spinoza’s geometrical form of argument and mechanistic view of 
nature were not accepted by them, which meant that Spinozists were really upholding a 
philosophy closer to that of Bruno, who had strongly influenced Spinoza. While it was advanced 
by Diderot and Rousseau, the ideas of the Radical Enlightenment came into their own in 
Germany towards the end of the Eighteenth and the beginning of the Nineteenth Centuries as a 
reaction against the atomism and utilitarianism of the Moderate Enlightenment. Kant, strongly 
influenced by Rousseau, was important in this, but it was through the radicalization of Kant’s 
efforts to defend freedom by rethinking Spinozism through Kant’s philosophy that the complex 
of ideas that can be identified as a development of the Radical Enlightenment came of age. The 
major figures in this development were Herder, Fichte, and the early Romantics, Hegel, 
Schleiermacher, and Schelling, although there were many others. While the basic assumptions 
of proponents of the Moderate Enlightenment are best characterized and identified through 
their affinity to Hobbes’ mechanistic world-view, the proponents of the Radical Enlightenment 
are best characterized and identified through their affinity to Herder’s philosophy. Herder, who 
defended democracy, saw nature as dynamic and creative, humans as socio-cultural beings 
striving for self-actualization and history as a slow and irregular progression towards greater 
humanity. Herder’s ideas were developed much more rigorously by his successors. While in the 
past Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche have received most attention as the figures in this movement, 
it is now coming to be recognized that to even understand the radical dimensions of these 
philosophers, and then to overcome their deficiencies, it is necessary to appreciate the 
contribution to philosophy and science and influence of Herder and Schelling, the ‘prince of the 
Romantics’. As I have argued in a number of places, it was Schelling who combined the 
philosophies of Herder and Fichte by developing the more radical ideas of Kant to challenge the 
Newtonian world-view, thereby inspiring Naturphilosophie, post-mechanist science and new 
forms of mathematics.22 The view of the Romantics as only concerned with art and literature 
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while defending emotion and feeling against reason has been exposed as a caricature of its 
major figures. Coleridge, allied with Schelling, cultivated a circle of the leading scientists and 
mathematicians of his day, including the mathematician William Hamilton, and promoted the 
work of Faraday. To a considerable extent, the most creative developments in science since 
that time can be seen as progress of the Romantic conception of nature as consisting of activity 
producing and maintaining stable forms, fields of force and self-organizing processes in place of 
Newtonian cosmology.23 
THE DIALECTIC OF THE RADICAL AND THE MODERATE ENLIGHTENMENTS 
I have argued elsewhere that the subsequent history of philosophy, science, the humanities and 
European culture can be understood as the struggle between proponents of the Moderate and 
the Radical Enlightenments. 24 This does not mean that there was not a great diversity of 
philosophies or that any particular philosopher can be neatly categorized on one side or the 
other of this opposition, or that all philosophy was aligned with the Enlightenment. 
Nevertheless, the history of modernity only becomes fully intelligible when this dialectic is 
recognized. Recognizing this dialectic makes it much easier to understand the confusions in 
individual thinkers as proponents of each tradition struggled to assimilate ideas or advances 
from the opposing tradition, with proponents of the Radical Enlightenment also finding 
common ground with conservative and sometimes reactionary opponents of the Moderate 
Enlightenment. The idea of evolution, for instance, originated with thinkers aligned with the 
Radical Enlightenment, but was given a very sinister twist by Darwin who was aligned with the 
Moderate Enlightenment and concerned to make sense of, and thereby tacitly to legitimate, 
the brutality and imperialism of Victorian society.25 Later, he attempted to soften his original 
views, moving them closer to the Radical Enlightenment in The Descent of Man. Marx was 
clearly aligned with the Radical Enlightenment (although he also drew on the work of 
conservatives), but in his effort to incorporate while criticizing ideas from the Moderate 
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Enlightenment found himself misinterpreted by most of his followers as an essentially 
Hobbesian thinker, leading him to proclaim that if there was one thing he knew, it was that he 
was not a Marxist.26  
The same confusion is often found in social and political movements, greatly magnified by 
deliberate efforts of the leaders of these to disguise their true colours. Traditional liberalism 
derives from Locke and was not committed to democracy. As C.B. Macpherson noted, up until 
the mid-eighteenth century, ‘[e]verybody who was anybody knew that democracy, in its 
original sense of rule by the people or government in accordance with the will of the bulk of the 
people, would be a bad thing – fatal to individual freedom.’27 However a different form of 
liberalism developed as part of the Radical Enlightenment exemplified by Herder and Wilhelm 
von Humboldt. John Stuart Mill, strongly influenced by Bentham, began as a radical Lockean 
liberal, but influenced by Romantic poetry, Coleridge, Kant, Herder, and von Humboldt, he 
increasingly aligned himself with the Radical Enlightenment. His later ideas influenced the 
British Idealists who promoted social liberalism (or ‘liberal socialism’) very much in the tradition 
of the Radical Enlightenment, who in turn were a major influence on the development of the 
welfare state and social democracy.28 Opponents of this trend among those aligned with 
Lockean liberalism do not proclaim themselves opponents of democracy, but redefine 
democracy as ‘freedom to shop’ without people being told what they should buy or sell.29 For 
those inspired by the Ancient Greek notion of democracy or the republicanism of the civic 
humanists, including Cornelius Castoriadis, Benjamin Barber, and Michael Sandel, this is not 
democracy at all.30 Most (although not all) of the leaders of the communist revolution in Russia 
were aligned with the Moderate Enlightenment, seeing communism as a means to mobilize 
society to achieve rational mastery over nature, while using the higher ideals of Marx (to 
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overcome alienation and democratize the economy) and those who believed in these as a 
disguise for their Moderate Enlightenment values.31 When, in 1967, Czechoslovakian Marxists, 
aligned with the Radical Enlightenment (led philosophically by Karel Kosik), attempted to 
implement a form of humanist Marxism, they were crushed. Even Naziism was initially 
influenced by the Radical Enlightenment. This was the case with a number of important anti-
reductionist scientists who initially were attracted to Nazism.32 Heidegger, when he was 
apologizing for the Nazis, was a conservative also strongly influenced by Radical Enlightenment 
ideas. However, Hitler was a social Darwinist who ignored works in German philosophy, such as 
the work of Fichte and Nietzsche who are often identified as antecedents to Nazism, and spent 
his time carefully studying the obscure works of social Darwinists on scientific racism.33 These 
defined his true, racist agenda.  
Once these confusions are seen through, the current trajectory of civilization under the 
hegemony of a new global ruling class based in transnational corporations deploying the 
ideology of neo-liberalism should not surprise anyone. It is a return to the dominant thinking of 
European and Western civilization after a brief interlude where ideas from the Moderate 
Enlightenment had been discredited and ideas from the Radical Enlightenment had been in the 
ascendant. Nor should it surprise anyone that vulgar Marxists from Eastern Europe, who are 
now part of the European Union, and Maoists from Western Europe should have aligned 
themselves with neo-liberalism and opposed social democracy, 34  since they never took 
seriously those aspects of Marx’s philosophy inspired by the Radical Enlightenment. Western 
Marxist philosophers, such as Herbert Marcuse, had recognized this from the beginning. The 
rule of the world by the managers of transnational corporations is really an alliance of market 
fundamentalism and managerialism against democracy. For proponents of the Moderate 
Enlightenment, modernization means controlling nature more efficiently. While supposedly in 
the service of humanity, people are treated as ‘human resources’ or ‘standing reserve’ to be 
efficiently exploited (as Heidegger pointed out), or as an excess that will eventually be 
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eliminated through the process of natural selection (although this is never talked about).35 This 
conception of the world is assumed and purveyed by adherents of neo-liberalism and the 
doctrine of the selfish gene. In the modern or postmodern world, this way of thinking and this 
belief structure are assumed rather than defended. It is embodied in organizations and in 
people’s habitual way of interpreting every situation, their habitus, to use Pierre Bourdieu’s 
language.36 It is taken as the hard-headed view of reality, and anything opposing it is seen as 
unnatural. What are taken to be the units in the struggle for survival vary from species, races, 
individuals to genes. In its most recent incarnation race is less significant and genes and 
individuals are more prominent. Billionaires and the brightest and best graduates of top 
universities who serve them, whatever their racial background, are seen to have proved 
themselves superior beings who therefore should dominate lower life forms, whether human 
or non-human. Just as the market should be freed to allow this logic to work itself out, so also 
there should not be any effort to prevent ecological destruction, apart from market generated 
responses.37 The strong will survive and be better for having met this challenge while excess 
population will be eliminated.  
Once the history, coherence, and trajectory of the Moderate Enlightenment is understood, it is 
possible to get a clearer picture of the challenge posed to it by the Radical Enlightenment. The 
tradition of the Radical Enlightenment is more difficult to discern because it has been a 
subordinate tradition, plundered for its insights, frequently distorted, and most importantly, 
denied proper recognition for its achievements, most importantly for its success up until the 
1970s in advancing democracy and the conditions for its functioning, including providing people 
with economic security and extending education in the liberal arts. For the Radical 
Enlightenment, liberty is understood as not being enslaved, where enslavement is understood 
as being in a position in which one can be harmed by those on whom one is dependent.38 
Liberty is guaranteed through participation in one’s governance and by maintaining the 
institutions that recognize the freedom and significance of each individual. The institutions 
through which people could be recognized as free and govern themselves were the institutions 
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of the civitas libera or ‘free state.’39 Under the influence of the Radical Enlightenment 
philosophy in Germany associated with Kant, Herder, Fichte, and Hegel, it also meant freedom 
to do what is worthwhile.40 As a follower of the British Idealists (who were influenced by the 
Germans), Walter Murdoch, wrote in 1912 in a book written for school children: 
Liberty – the only liberty worth fighting for – should be thought of, not as 
freedom from, but as freedom to; not freedom from this or that restraint, but 
freedom to do this or that thing that is worth doing. … [L]ook upon liberty as a 
positive thing, - as freedom to do, to be, to enjoy, to understand, - and you will 
find that, in innumerable ways, government sets us free. … The aim of the best 
government is to make the best kind of life possible to all.41 
Through doing what is worthwhile, people achieve self-realization, a notion that had been 
developed by Herder in the late Eighteenth Century. Depriving people of access to the means of 
production and forcing them to compete for employment while maintaining a large reserve 
army of unemployed is a new form of slavery that has to be overcome by unionizing workers, 
extending the franchise for elections and engaging in national politics to ensure that people 
have economic security, guaranteed employment, and the conditions of work that will make 
work fulfilling. Along with all this, as with the Ancient Greeks, Cicero, the civic humanists of the 
Florentine Renaissance and the German revival of these ideas, cultivating the highest potential 
of people and civilizing them through education was seen as absolutely essential to advancing 
all this. The Humboldtian form of the university in which first Arts Faculties and then Arts and 
Science Faculties had privileged status because of their commitment to truth, was one of the 
most important contributions of the Radical Enlightenment to civilization. Such ideas gained 
traction from the late nineteenth century onwards as governments in conflict with each other 
aligned themselves with such ideas and their proponents to gain support from their own 
populations and to undermine support for the governments of rival nations.  
The sabotaging by neo-liberals with well funded and well organized think tanks of all the 
achievements made by those committed to liberty, self-realization, and the pursuit of truth 
involved a massive drive for cultural hegemony to organize consent.42 They waged a campaign 
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against the ‘State’ and ‘Big Government’, calling for lower taxes and promoting a culture of 
consumerism. There was resistance to this, but it was pathetically inadequate. Neo-liberals 
were successful because of the ease with which they were able to co-opt potential opposition, 
partly because this opposition was so confused. To begin with, they co-opted economists in 
universities and their graduates who took over and transformed civil services. Pierre Bourdieu 
characterized these as a ‘new state nobility’, ‘a small group of academically educated elites 
[that] feels entitled to rearrange society top to bottom because of its superior knowledge and 
its economist approach.’ As he pointed out:  
This state-nobility, preaching the retreat of the state and the undivided rule of 
market and consumer – this commercial substitute of the citizen – has 
monopolized the state. It has transformed public into private property and made 
the public matter of the republic its own private concern. What matters today is 
reclaiming of democracy and its victory over technocracy.  
Bourdieu wrote of this development as an ‘ideology of competence’ or ‘racism of intelligence’: 
‘In fact, the power of neo-liberal hegemony is based on a new form of social Darwinism: In the 
words of Harvard, “the best and the most remarkable” win the race.’43 What is more difficult to 
understand is the role played in this by academics and students in Arts Faculties. These 
‘intellectuals’ thought of themselves as radicals when they rejected Radical Enlightenment 
ideas promulgated by proponents of hermeneutics, existential phenomenology, and humanist 
Marxism and embraced structuralism and post-structuralism, doctrines that reduced individuals 
to nothing but effects of structures. This implies that democracy is impossible, at least one 
which assumes the capacity of people to take responsibility for the governance of their 
societies, to develop a comprehensive understanding of their goals and ideals, to interrogate 
received beliefs and institutions, and to participate in discussions and decision-making and 
make judgements. What they were promoting, as Carl Boggs has argued, was an ‘antipolitics’ 
which effectively was surrender to, and government and enslavement by, transnational 
corporations. With opposition to neo-liberalism crippled in universities it was a relatively easy 
matter for neo-liberals to transform previously leftist political parties, newspapers, and trade 
unions and even to invade and transform primary and secondary education.44  
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DEEP ECOLOGY AND THE RADICAL ENLIGHTENMENT 
Where does deep ecology stand in relation to all this? It should be clear from the account of 
Herder’s ideas that the doctrines defended by Arne Naess and those he influenced (such as the 
notion of self-realization) which he saw as having its roots in the philosophy of Spinoza were 
echoes and developments of Herder’s philosophy. Ecology itself originated with scientists 
influenced by Naturphilosophie and aligned with the Radical Enlightenment, although some 
ecologists have defended a reductionist form of it. Fritjof Capra’s alignment with deep ecology 
becomes intelligible when the influence on science of Schelling’s philosophy is appreciated. 
Seen in this light, facing up to all dimensions of the destructive effects of modernity and the 
assumptions that underpinned the social order that has become so destructive, deep ecology 
stands out as an island of sanity against the juggernaut of the megamachine (to use Lewis 
Mumford’s term) engendered by the Moderate Enlightenment.  
Yet the deep ecologists had not freed themselves completely from the spell of the Moderate 
Enlightenment. Like the later Romantics who were pilloried by Heinrich Heine, most of those 
who embraced deep ecology appear to have not taken seriously the task of replacing the 
Moderate Enlightenment as Herder and the early Romantics aspired to do. This, essentially, is 
the conclusion reached by Carl Boggs, one of the most profound Marxist critics of late 
modernity. Boggs is far from being unsympathetic to the Greens. In Ecology and Revolution: 
Global Crisis and the Political Challenge, he noted that ‘the Greens have for three decades 
embodied the closest thing the world has seen to a mature, strategically defined ecological 
Radicalism. Despite limits and flaws, they seem to constitute the only political force, with some 
global presence, dedicated to reversing the modern crisis – and the only force with a coherent 
strategy for change.’45 However, Boggs also argued that the potential of the Greens is not being 
realized because they have not faced up the forces driving ecological destruction. In an earlier 
work he wrote of deep ecology, focusing explicitly on Naess, Capra, and Snyder: 
Ecological crisis, according to Arne Naess, strikes at the very heart of modern 
culture, especially in the United States, “because of our inability to question 
deeply what is and what is not worthwhile in life.” The main challenge is to 
mount a thoroughgoing cultural revolution since, in Naess’ words, “Our culture is 
the only one in the history of mankind in which our culture has adjusted itself to 
the technology, rather than vice-versa.” The emphasis on normal politics in 
conventional environmentalism fails to see this, and yet ends up with, a kind of 
“computerized cost-benefit analysis designed to benefit only humans.” … The 
political value of deep ecology is ultimately weakened by a theory that fetishizes 
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“nature” and turns it into something detached from the real, ever changing, 
conditions of social existence. … Despite the undeniable radical vision of deep 
ecology, it contains no language of political engagement, no effort to specify 
how epochal transformations might be expected to unfold in real time and space, 
With alienated individuals pitted against huge (but largely incomprehensible) 
structures of domination, deep ecology simply assumes that an outmoded 
system, propped up by Enlightenment values will gradually be replaced by an 
entirely new civilization rooted in the equilibrium between humans and nature.46 
For those who know of Naess’ work, this clearly does not do justice to his efforts in Ecology, 
Community and Lifestyle to work out what kind of political action can be taken,47 and, like most 
Marxists, Boggs has not fully faced up to the failures of communist governments and of 
Marxism. With the notable exception of Ernst Bloch, who generally is ignored, Western 
Marxists have tended to treat nature as a social category, and with the exception of Bloch, have 
made very little effort to develop a political philosophy. Nevertheless, for those who have been 
involved with the environmental movement, there is a ring of truth to Boggs’ complaint. The 
failure of both deep ecologists and Marxists was manifest in the entirely predictable global 
financial crisis that began in 2007. While prior to the 1970s economic crisis the neo-liberal 
movement had been developing a whole raft of policies to put in place when the opportunity 
arose, with the exception of a very small number of isolated individuals and groups, the political 
movements that had been marginalized by neo-liberalism had made very little effort to develop 
a comprehensive and viable alternative political, economic, social, and cultural agenda, reviving 
but going well beyond the environmentally engaged policies put in place by Franklin Roosevelt 
in USA in response to the Great Depression of the 1930s. Like the later Romantics, it is clear 
that most of those supposedly radical political movements did not take their own rhetoric 
seriously and had accommodated themselves to occupying comfortable positions within the 
neo-liberal order, similar in some respects to the role of courter jesters in medieval society. 
 Once the tradition of the Radical Enlightenment and its fundamental opposition to the 
Moderate Enlightenment is understood, however, it should be evident that there was no need 
for the retreat of the 1970s. What appears to have happened is that those whose allegiance 
had been to mere fragments of what I have characterized as the tradition of the Radical 
Enlightenment lost the larger plot, the story of the advance of civilization as the development 
of greater humanity and democracy as self-governance. This is the real meaning of the 
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postmodern claim that there is an “incredulity towards metanarratives”. It is not merely 
incredulity; it is a failure to properly appreciate what the plot was in the first place, largely due 
to the confusion generated by those purporting to stand for the ideals of the Radical 
Enlightenment when they were really deeply committed to the quest for power sanctioned by 
the Moderate Enlightenment, and then simply ignorance of the Radical Enlightenment, its core 
ideas and its history. Promoting individual rights without responsibilities and utilitarianism 
generally functioned as Trojan horses for the Moderate Enlightenment. Meanwhile, different 
components of the Radical Enlightenment have survived and been further developed.  
The most important of these are found in political philosophy. The Radical Enlightenment above 
all was opposed to slavery and upheld the quest by people to govern themselves, and if they 
are to govern themselves, then politics is absolutely central. Through the work of Cornelius 
Castoriadis we can now understand what this meant for the Ancient Greeks.48 Similarly, 
through the work of Quentin Skinner we can now understand what this meant for the Ancient 
Roman republicans and the political thinkers of the Florentine Renaissance to live in a republic 
(that is, a ‘public thing’) and what they saw as being required to defend their liberty, and how 
Lockean liberals and Benthamite utilitarians have subverted liberty.49 Appreciating the works of 
these earlier thinkers, we can better appreciate the developments in political philosophy in 
early Nineteenth Century Germany, and then with the British and American Idealists and the 
process metaphysicians (including John Dewey) they influenced in the late Nineteenth and first 
part of the Twentieth Century. We can also understand why, in each case, in Ancient Greece, 
Renaissance Florence, and late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth Century Germany and late 
Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century this quest for autonomy, liberty, or freedom was 
associated with bursts of cultural creativity. It is in these societies that people interrogated their 
institutions, ways of life, and beliefs and struggled to develop and sustain the virtues required 
to defend their liberty and govern themselves.  
We can also see why this was also associated with greater appreciation of nature and why this 
tended to be seen as self-creating, while their opponents tend to deny real creativity and 
thereby any significance to nature. Hierarchical organizations which aspire to total control of 
both their subordinates and what they wish to control cannot acknowledge real creativity or 
intrinsic significance to these without circumscribing their ambitions to dominate. Analysing 
this logic and its origins, Lewis Mumford wrote: 
With mordant symbolism, the ultimate products of the megamachine in Egypt 
were colossal tombs, inhabited by mummified corpses; while later in Assyria, as 
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repeatedly in every other expanding empire, the chief testimony to its technical 
efficiency was a waste of destroyed villages and cities, and poisoned soils: the 
prototype of similar “civilized” atrocities today.50 
It is in reacting against this that those aspiring to democracy defend the creativity and 
significance of nature, from Anaximander to the Nature Enthusiasts to Herder and the early 
Romantics to the process metaphysicians.51 One of the most important battles that has to be 
fought at present is the subversion of autonomy, liberty, and democracy by the new global 
corporatocracy and its priesthood of neo-liberal economists, reducing everything and all people 
but themselves to resources to be efficiently exploited by the market and its managers. And as 
other Greens, notably those associated with ecological economics have realized, overcoming 
this slavery means subordinating markets to communities of communities organized 
democratically at multiple levels.52 Working out how to achieve this is underway, but it is a 
huge task, requiring integration of thousands of years of political insight while simultaneously 
struggling to understand the new problems generated by the complexity of the present.53 
The second important component of the Radical Enlightenment is cosmology, our conception of 
the order of the universe and our place within it. Despite the trivialization of philosophy by 
analytic philosophers and the efforts to reduce science to nothing but a means to make 
predictions and develop technology, thereby crippling work in science that is not reductionist, 
there have been major advances in the effort to understand nature as self-organizing, and 
thereby, to situate humans as participants in a creative nature. In philosophy, this is associated 
with reviving interest in the work of Schelling, which has enabled a range of philosophers, 
including C.S. Peirce, Aleksandr Bogdanov, Alfred North Whitehead, and Ludwig von Bertalanffy 
to be recognized as part of a coherent tradition of process metaphysics that is underpinning a 
revolution in science. While elementary particle physics has stagnated, major advances have 
been made in non-linear thermodynamics, theoretical biology, and, most importantly, ecology 
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under the banner of complexity science. Now non-reductionist ecology is being promoted as a 
replacement for physics as the pre-eminent science against which all other sciences should be 
measured, with organisms conceived as highly integrated ecosystems.54 While in the early 
1980s ecologists were distancing themselves from earlier anti-reductionist forms of ecology and 
from environmentalists, this is no longer the case. One of the most promising developments 
associated with this is the development of biosemiotics and ecosemiotics, with ‘semiosis’ (the 
production and interpretation of signs), held to be the defining feature of life.  
FROM THE RADICAL ENLIGHTENMENT TO ECOLOGICAL CIVILIZATION 
To some extent, these developments support deep ecology, with some qualifications. Humans 
with their cultures and institutions must be seen as part of ecosystems, or at least, regimes of 
ecosystems, and can only exist in the process of their functioning, concurring with Naess’ 
‘relational, total-field image’ in which organisms are ‘knots in the biospherical net or field of 
intrinsic relations.’ Taking the goal of science as ‘understanding’ (involving ‘indwelling”, to use 
Michael Polanyi’s terminology), seeing nature as self-organizing and recognizing semiosis as 
central to life, it is now very easy to appreciate the intrinsic value of all life, including 
ecosystems, and to conceive of humans, including their organizations and culture, as part of 
nature, and to defend self-realization as the end of life. In fact, to indwell in nature, to 
understand nature as self-organizing and self-creating and to appreciate the semiosis involved 
in living processes makes it almost impossible not to appreciate the intrinsic significance of life. 
On this view we are internally related to ecosystems; but not to all life. These ecosystems can 
be healthy or unhealthy, and their unhealthiness can be due to the specific forms developed by 
humans, but they can also be due to non-human living processes. While appreciating the 
intrinsic value of all life, ultimately, it is necessary to judge human cultures, institutions and 
activities and all other life forms according to whether they augment or undermine the health 
of the ecosystems of which they are part, including the global ecosystem or Gaia. It is Aldo 
Leopold’s land ethic focused on the integrity, stability and beauty of ‘biotic communities’ rather 
than Naess’s ‘biospherical egalitarianism’ that needs to be built upon. 
Another word for health is sanity, from the Latin word for health, sanitas. It was on this 
understanding of the term that James A. Coffman and Donald C. Mikulecky wrote their recent 
book, Global Insanity: How Homo sapiens Lost Touch with Reality while Transforming the 
World.55 Their diagnosis largely concurs with the work of theoretical biologists who have 
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examined the growth of transnational corporations. Mae-Wan Ho argued that they are cancers 
in the global ecosystem, pointing out (along with the theoretical ecologist Robert Ulanowicz): 
The economic globalization promoted by the rich countries in the World Trade 
Organization is aimed at removing all barriers to trade, finance and procurement, 
which is tantamount to destroying the system’s intricate space-time structure. 
This inevitably results in the over-exploitation of the poor, especially in third 
world countries, that will impoverish the whole economic system. But that is not 
all. As the global economic system is embedded in the global ecosystem, over-
exploitation in the global economy will drive people to use natural resources at 
unsustainable rates, so that the global ecosystem increasingly fails to renew 
itself. This leads to diminished input into the economic system so that even more 
natural resources will have to be harvested, resulting in a vicious cycle that will 
ultimately destroy both the global economy and the earth’s ecosystem.56 
This development, Coffman and Mikulecki argue, is a manifestation of a civilization that has 
fundamentally misconceived the nature of life and, as a consequence, has been operating with 
fundamentally defective models of nature and the place of humanity within it. It is necessary to 
replace the current defective models of ourselves and our relation to the rest of nature.  
To correct our defective models it will be necessary to transform the human sciences, seeing 
humans simultaneously as part of nature and as self-creative. This will require the development 
of human ecology as a transdiscipline to reinterpret anthropology, integrate physical and 
human geography and subordinate or replace sociology and to situate economics, and the 
development of an institutionalist form of ecological economics to replace mainstream 
economics. The latter is required to free economics from the assumption of humans as homo 
economicus – efficient functioning psychopaths (in the tradition of thought that goes back to 
Hobbes) and to focus on what kinds of institutions are required to augment our ecosystems, as 
well as to situate humanity within nature.57 These developments in turn should provide the 
basis for policy formation, with democracy-friendly retrospective path analysis and position 
analysis (which can be easily formulated as a developments of narratology – defining our goals 
by refiguring the stories we are living out) replacing the pseudo-experts of cost-benefit analyses. 
The value accorded all life by deep ecologists and their call for a transformation of civilization 
are no longer idealistic sentiments; incorporated into a regenerated form of the Radical 
Enlightenment they are now essential for the survival of most of humanity, and possibly 
civilization, as well as most of the world’s species and ecosystems. However, it has become 
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clear that it is virtually impossible to frighten people into action. People have to be inspired by 
hope. As Naess argued, it is necessary to put forward utopian visions of the future. However, 
here also the deep ecologists have not been successful. The response of Thomas Prugh, Robert 
Costanza, and Herman Daly to their vision illustrates the problem:  
There seems to be only two visions put on the table. In the conventional vision, 
the human economy and population keep growing vigorously, and everyone 
eagerly chases the dream of greater consumption. The environmentalist point of 
view rightly denies the workability of this vision but offers in its place a kind of 
lifelong global celery diet. It is hardly surprising that most people choose the first 
path.58 
The humanities are particularly important in addressing this problem and thus have to be 
revived. As Mikhail Epstein noted, the immediate practical outcome of the sciences is 
technology, of the social sciences, the transformation of society through politics; the practical 
outcome of the humanities is the transformation of culture.59 This must transform the nature of 
the sciences and technology and how they are conceived, and thereby our relationship to the 
rest of nature, to each other and to our communities. To achieve this, it is necessary to present 
a vision of the future that really engages most of humanity. To achieve this it will be necessary 
to rescue philosophy from analytic philosophers. It will be necessary for philosophers to provide 
synopses of all aspects of their civilizations, their histories and their present condition and 
develop new syntheses (that is, new conceptual frameworks) that do justice to all dimensions 
of experience and enable people to orient themselves to create the future.  
To this end, philosophy must be historical, orienting people in the present to create the future 
through an understanding of the past with all its achievements and failures. This will require far 
more hard work than most deep ecologists thought necessary. It will mean engaging with all 
specialized areas of research in the sciences and humanities to reveal, criticize, and, if necessary, 
replace defective assumptions, and put all specialist disciplines in perspective (as the great 
philosophers of the past prior to the rise of analytic philosophy attempted to do), thereby 
orienting researchers in these diverse specialized areas to transform their disciplines to align 
them with the Radical Enlightenment. To give the humanities a backbone, it will be necessary to 
make the history and philosophy of science (historically oriented) central and uphold some 
version of process metaphysics, that is, the anti-mechanistic tradition of philosophy and science 
going back to Herder, Goethe, and Schelling and defended by recent scientists such as Ilya 
Prigogine, Robert Ulanowicz, and Lee Smolin, that grants a central place to real creativity in 
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nature. Only in this way will it be possible to overcome the cringe of the humanities in the face 
of the scientism promoted by US analytic philosophers and reveal the enormous potential of 
post-reductionist science inspired by the tradition of the Radical Enlightenment. What should 
emerge from this is a far more hard-headed vision of the future than Naess was able to provide, 
a vision that incorporates the reworking of the natural and social sciences and, given what has 
happened over the last half century, a reformulated grand narrative of life on Earth as the 
struggle to liberate humanity from enslavement to the corporatocracy and the global market so 
people as individuals and community members can fully realize their potential to augment life. 
The aim should be to create a new global civilization based on ecology and human ecology 
rather than physics and mainstream economics, to free people so that that they no longer have 
to participate in the destruction of life to prosper economically but will be free to prosper while 
augmenting life. In place of the monologic grand narratives of the past that purported to grasp 
the whole of reality and to judge every particular perspective from the one, true perspective 
vouchsafed by theology or science (or in the case of the neo-liberals, a perverted combination 
of the two in which a purported ‘science’ of economics deifies and sacrifices everything to the 
market), it will be necessary to develop a dialogic, polyphonic grand narrative that 
acknowledges diverse perspectives, fostering their engagement with each other and with this 
grand narrative, endlessly struggling to do justice to every aspect of reality. As Mikhail Epstein 
argued, ‘the fundamental principle of transcultural thinking and existence’ is the ‘[l]iberation 
from culture through culture itself’, generating a ‘transcultural world which lies not apart from, 
but within all existing cultures.’60 This is the condition for creativity in the quest for truth, 
justice, and liberty, for as the Russian philosopher Vladimir Bibler observed, ‘Culture can live 
and develop, as culture, only on the borders of cultures.’61 This outcome will be the dialogic, 
polyphonic grand narrative of a new global civilization; an ‘ecological civilization’.62 
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